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5 May 2026: Weekly Update – Food Inflation, Hormuz and the Next Supply Shock

Weekly Update
Economic Outlook

The disruption in the Strait of Hormuz is increasingly feeding through to fertiliser markets, raising the risk of a prolonged and underappreciated wave of food inflation into 2027.

The energy shock has been the dominant market story for the better part of two months, and it has been written about exhaustively. The food shock that will follow it has not - yet its impact later this year and into 2027 is currently being decided in the fields, not refineries. With the Bank of England having held its Bank Rate at 3.75% last week and accepting, in notably measured language, that higher inflation is now unavoidable, the question is no longer whether UK food prices rise sharply from here but how far they go, how long they linger, and whether markets have yet begun to price them properly.

The Strait of Hormuz is well understood as a chokepoint for seaborne oil and LNG. Less appreciated is its parallel role in global nitrogen fertiliser supply. The Gulf states rank among the world's largest exporters of urea and ammonia. Qatar is a principal supplier of sulphur, a critical input in phosphate production. The disruption has already forced fertiliser manufacturers in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Egypt to curtail output or pay sharply elevated spot prices for LNG as feedstock. Russian and Chinese supply continues to flow, but it does not fully close the Middle Eastern shortfall. What makes this more than an input-cost story is timing. The fertiliser application window for Northern Hemisphere spring-planted crops is open right now. Where inputs are unaffordable or simply unobtainable, farmers will reduce application rates, switch to less nitrogen-hungry varieties or leave acreage fallow. That decision does not register in consumer prices for months: it comes about through lower yields, tighter grain stocks and rising feed costs before crystallising in food prices from late 2026 into 2027.

The UK inflation forecast picture has already begun to shift in response. The Bank of England's April Monetary Policy Report projected food inflation rising to around 4.6% by September, noting explicitly that fertiliser costs would push food prices "further out". The Food and Drink Federation, representing around 12,000 UK manufacturers, has revised its end-2026 forecast sharply higher to 9-10%; the Institute of Grocery Distribution models above 8% by mid-summer under its more adverse scenario. UK food inflation was running at only 3.7% in March, so even a path well below those upper bounds implies a substantial wave still to arrive. Bread, dairy and meat - the more fertiliser and feed intensive components of the basket - are likely to lead.

Inflation rates for food prices

Picture1

Dotted line: February 2026 projection. Dashed line: 2012-2019 average. Source: Bank of England Monetary Policy Report April 2026

There are genuine offsets, and we do not dismiss them. UK food retailers operate on contracted pricing with lags measured in months and have shown consistent willingness to lean on suppliers when input costs spike. Crop substitution towards legumes partially cushioned the 2022 inflationary episode and will do so again. Sterling has held up reasonably well against the US dollar, dampening the import price channel. And prolonged food price inflation eventually produces demand destruction of its own. In our view, the plausible central path sits materially above the Bank's 4.6% projection and well below the trade body's more alarming upper bounds. That is still a considerably more uncomfortable outcome than gilt yields currently appear to be pricing.

What distinguishes food inflation from the initial energy spike - and what much of the conventional narrative is missing - is its character rather than its size. Energy prices have historically tended to overshoot and then retrace as supply responds to price incentives over multi-year horizons - and the futures curve currently embeds an assumption of gradual normalisation through 2027. Food inflation is stickier, driven by physical supply deficits that take a growing season to correct, and it is structurally more regressive: lower-income households spend a materially larger share of their budgets on essentials, which means the political as well as the economic pressure will remain long after Brent crude has retreated from its peaks. This matters for the rate path. The Bank of England faces not a single inflationary episode but a relay race, with energy passing the baton to food at precisely the moment markets expect it to resume cutting. The cruellest aspect of this handover is mechanical: energy's contribution to the annual CPI comparison will be fading through base effects just as the food component will likely be accelerating. That awkward handover is not yet adequately reflected in the gilt market's implied path.

For the T. Bailey funds, this is a story the portfolios are already broadly positioned for. The preference for short-to-medium dated bonds avoids the duration that a persistent, belated food inflation wave would continue to punish; running yields at current levels remain attractive without requiring a view on rates that is more benign than the evidence warrants. Holdings in gold and copper continue to serve their role as real asset hedges: as we noted in the 30 March update, the structural demand from emerging market central banks that has been driving gold's longer-term trend has, if anything, intensified through the conflict. Within equities, our thematic emphasis on healthcare - where demand is largely non-discretionary - on water and infrastructure through the Regnan Sustainable Water and Waste Fund, and on value-oriented strategies such as WS Havelock Global Select and Ranmore Global Equity, reflects a consistent preference for businesses with genuine pricing power over those exposed to rising input costs and softening consumer confidence. The food channel also reinforces our caution on consumer discretionary names: lower-income households face a squeeze in real income that will persist through 2026 regardless of how the energy price trajectory evolves, keeping trade-down pressure well in place.

Our base case for the Hormuz crisis itself remains a managed, if uncomfortable, off-ramp. Both sides retain genuine political and economic incentives to find one, and Sunday's announcement of "Project Freedom" - the US operation to guide neutral shipping through the Strait - keeps a path to this open, however narrow and fragile it currently appears. But the supply chain that links Gulf gas to fertiliser, to Northern Hemisphere fields, to supermarket shelves does not reset the moment shipping resumes. A diplomatic breakthrough that produces a relief rally in oil and risk assets in the coming weeks - of the kind that briefly lifted markets at the end of March and into April - may tempt investors to unwind inflation protection alongside it. We think that would be premature.

The barrel is the story everyone is watching. The bushel is the one we will be reading about in twelve months' time.

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